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E

vents in recent decades have produced a broader definition of security.1
The entry of phrases like “environmental security,” “resource conflict,”
and “energy security” into the lexicon of security experts provides examples
of this changing dialogue, but these concepts remain on the margins of the
discussion for the most part. Where US energy policy is concerned, the debate
generally has been limited to arguments that the United States must preserve
its access to the oil reserves of the Middle East and Central Asia, and a vague
sense that domestic energy supplies would be highly desirable. Cornucopian
optimists continue to insist that oil will remain abundant and cheap for the
foreseeable future, and indeed more concern is expressed over the unsavory
character of governments in major oil-producing states than over the finite
nature of the resources themselves.
The vagaries of oil politics (and the ecological problems raised by
carbon emissions) are indeed serious problems, and they are not entirely separable from the questions this article means to raise, but the focus here will be
on the problem of fossil fuel scarcity at the global level. This article seeks to
provide an overview of the situation, including the prospects for an economy
based on renewable energy, the security problems likely to result from tightening oil supplies, and a possible basis for making the transition to alternatives widely acknowledged as inevitable in the long run.

The Outlook for Energy
At the time of this writing, the price of oil has hit $70 per barrel and is
projected to rise even higher in the near term. While not a record when the figSpring 2006
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ure is adjusted for inflation, this was still commonly taken as a sign that the
era of “cheap energy” may be coming to an end.
Other numbers bear this out. Annual worldwide oil consumption is
roughly 29 billion barrels a year, and estimated to be rising at two percent annually.2 While there is widespread disagreement over their actual size, the
world’s total “proven” reserves of oil come to roughly one trillion barrels. A
linear projection has oil supplies running out around 2030 after a long period
of rising prices and tightening supplies, likely to begin after production
peaks, generally expected to be sometime between 2010 and 2020—maybe
just five years away.
The consequences of a shortfall in oil supplies on the scale of such
predictions are as obvious as they are terrifying. A prolonged economic contraction and possibly a desperate scramble for resources that might bring major powers to blows are not out of the question, especially when the cost of
other problems likely to place more pressure on the energy base (climate
change, water shortages, population growth, etc.) are taken into account.3 In
the absolute worst case, modernity might simply grind to a halt, a catastrophe
that James Howard Kunstler describes in his recent book on the subject, The
Long Emergency.
Of course, linear projections have their limitations, and any number of developments could throw them off—unanticipated changes in the
character of economic productivity, or an economic slowdown, for instance.
Actual oil reserves are likely larger than the proven figure, which would
delay the crunch for some years. Rising energy needs will mean higher
prices and shorter supplies, which will stretch out the supply by encouraging conservation.4 They also will produce increased efforts to supplement
oil with more plentiful coal, “heavy oil,” and natural gas. The degree to
which these alternatives can pick up the slack, however, is a subject of intense disagreement, as all these resources will mean higher energy prices.5
Moreover, they do not eliminate the problem of the finite amount of these resources, with natural gas reserves particularly unlikely to last all that much
longer than oil.
In short, the oil age may end within a generation given the present
economic picture, with potentially dire consequences. The prospects of alternatives to fossil fuels are therefore the key issue, such as the expanded use of
nuclear energy or, ideally, renewable energy sources. Many observers predict
Nader Elhefnawy is a graduate of Florida International University and a graduate student at the University of Miami. He has previously published several articles on international security and military topics in various periodicals including Armor and Astropolitics.
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that it will be decades at the very least before these inherently more difficult
energy sources can be exploited on a sufficiently large scale to meet the needs
of advanced societies. The use of renewables has expanded rapidly in recent
years, but these energy sources still supply only a small part of overall consumption, even in leaders like Denmark, where wind energy provides 10 to 15
percent of that country’s electricity. If anything, given the scope of the problem and the length of time for which it has been around, the pace of actual
progress has been frustratingly glacial. While the pace may be accelerating, a
gap between desired levels of energy output and those actually attainable
through these means is conceivable.
Nonetheless, the doomsday scenario posited by Kunstler and others
is not a necessary outcome. The problem is not that substitutes do not exist,
but that they are, in the view of many analysts, too expensive or too unwieldy
to support desired levels of economic productivity and living standards.
There is little doubt that there would be some significant transition costs, as
there are in every major economic change. Observers hostile to these technologies, however, routinely play on popular fears that any change in the status
quo will force Americans to give up their cars, or kill economic growth. Their
exaggerations aside, such arguments conveniently neglect the fact that the
exhaustion of oil resources in an unprepared world will be incalculably more
devastating than any plausible adaptation, and that the earlier the transition
begins, the easier it will be to spread the costs over time.
More important, such analyses tend to suffer from three major deficiencies that exaggerate the difficulties involved with alternatives. The first
is that calculating the costs and benefits of oil against other energy sources is
far more complicated than studies pointing to the cost-ineffectiveness of
renewables admit. Many costs of fossil fuel use are easily externalized, distorting the picture. The cost of pollution, military expenditures aimed at
securing oil sources, and other kinds of subsidies mask the actual price of
“cheap” oil—as do the very low gasoline taxes Americans enjoy.6 Certain
savings from the distributed energy production that renewables might allow,
while potentially substantial, are not easily or automatically factored into
such calculations.7 Moreover, solar, wind, and other sources will become relatively less expensive as oil prices rise. And it also should be noted that many
experts regard wind power as already competitive with fossil fuels in some
geographically favorable areas.
The tendency to underestimate the gains that alternatives may bring
is reinforced by a broader tendency to stress costs more than benefits, not
only on the part of oil industry boosters, but generally due to the changing nature of political debate.8 The potential for a rapid changeover also tends to be
underestimated, observers forgetting that comparably large transformations
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“A linear projection has oil supplies
running out around 2030.”

have happened before in a relatively short period of time. Oil became cheaper
than coal only in the mid-1950s, a mere 50 years ago. As a result, coal went
from generating 100 percent of Europe’s thermal electricity to less than half
by 1973, oil picking up much of the slack even as overall energy production
grew substantially.9
The second problem with such predictions is their built-in assumption that the relevant technologies will be static. Future improvements cannot
be taken for granted, but are a near-certainty nonetheless, given the prolonged
drop in the price of solar- and wind-generated energy since the 1970s, and the
prospects for both continued research and development and mass production.
The already low price of wind power can drop further still, given the potential
of innovations like flying wind generators. Capable of exploiting the jet
stream and returning the electricity to the ground through a tether, a few clusters of six hundred each could meet the entire energy needs of an industrial nation like Canada.10
There are even strong indications that electricity produced by photovoltaic solar cells will, assuming sufficient effort, become competitive in price
with even subsidized, deceptively cheap oil and gas in a matter of years rather
than decades. This may be due to new, low-cost materials; designs which use a
greater part of the electromagnetic spectrum; more efficient use of their surface
area; easily installed, self-assembling liquid solar cell coatings; and architectural structures maximizing output.11 Several of these developments could be
flashes in the pan, something to which energy production has sadly been prone;
for half a century fusion power has been “30 years away.” Nevertheless, given
the long-term trend of improvement and the number of directions from which
the problem is being attacked, some approaches will likely pay off.
A third problem is the tendency to view the matter as a choice between the outright replacement of fossil fuels or nothing at all. The reality,
however, is that partial solutions can provide a cushion until a more complete
transition can be brought about. This being the case, it matters little if renewable energy production will at first be undergirded by more traditional supplies. Solar cells and wind turbines will be made in factories powered by
oil-burning plants. To state this as proof that alternatives to oil are unrealistic
104
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is nonsense. The energy base of the future will have to be created using the energy base existing now, just as the oil-based economy was built using previously existing sources. Of greater concern, many schemes for a hydrogen
economy involve the extraction of hydrogen from natural gas or other fossil
fuels, with power supplied by traditional electricity sources like oil, coal, and
nuclear generators. Hydrogen, however, also can be extracted directly from
water through photoelectrochemical processes or electrolysis, which could
be powered by cheap wind and solar energy.12
The problem, then, is less the “technical ingenuity” needed to produce these technologies than the “social ingenuity” which will implement the
technologies on a national and global basis.13 Renewable energy technology
can potentially do the job; what is really at issue is whether or not good use
will be made of that potential. Nonetheless, the political problem posed by the
demise of the fossil fuel era is not limited to the challenge of constructing a
new energy base.

Security Concerns
Even without taking into account related problems like the greenhouse effect, the security problems posed by the exhaustion of supplies of
easily accessible, cheap oil and gas are highly varied and daunting. The likely
result would be the exacerbation of familiar problems like resource conflict,
weapons proliferation, and state failure. However, other problems are more
novel, not least of all the potential for changes in the international balance of
power based not only on which countries control the lion’s share of the
world’s fossil fuel supplies, but which are most dependent on those supplies.
New Resource Wars
The most obvious concern is a reinvigoration of resource conflict.
As the oil deposits believed to lie under a disputed piece of ground or sea floor
become more valuable economically, governments might be more prepared
to fight for them. Since the War on Terrorism began in 2001, China, seeing itself in a more vulnerable strategic position, has been more willing to negotiate its claims over the South China Sea.14 However, the issue has yet to be
resolved, and an oil-hungry China can yet take a harder line, especially if this
becomes more profitable. China also has behaved provocatively elsewhere,
sending naval vessels into Japanese claims around the Senkaku Islands.15
Similar conflicts remain unresolved in other regions, including sub-Saharan
Africa and Latin America.16 Moreover, even states unlikely to go to war
over territory would face greater prospects of involvement in an armed conflict, and find a powerful incentive to develop and deploy long-range powerprojection capabilities.
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Resource wars also can be a cause of internal conflicts or unrest. The
war in the Indonesian region of Aceh is partly driven by the government’s determination to hold onto an oil-rich region, and the resentment of the inhabitants has been partly a response to the damage oil production has done to local
communities. Oil also was at stake in the fight over East Timor, which on the
first day of its independence concluded a deal with Australia regarding its
oil-rich offshore claims.
The problem may in fact be exacerbated by certain solutions to the
world’s energy problems. To give one example, the development of new technologies which permit cost-effective drilling for oil in deeper waters could
create new flash-points. Cheaper deep-water drilling, for instance, would
make the oil under the South China Sea a more valuable prize.17 As certain
kinds of alternative energy technologies are developed, the value of certain
resources is also likely to become more strategically important (like platinum
for hydrogen fuel cells), with similar results.
As the situation stands, two-thirds of what were the high seas in 1958
have been “territorialized” to some degree. The United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea extended territorial waters from three to 12 miles, recognized 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones and 350-mile continental shelf
claims, and permitted the enclosure of the internal waters of archipelagic
states like Japan.18 At the same time, the mineral wealth of these regions has
remained largely unexploited. While the ambitious ocean mining schemes of
30 or 40 years ago amounted to little, rising energy costs and improved technology could give them a future—and make the right to profit from them a
new cause of conflict.
Increased Disorder
Resource conflict, however, is likely to be confined within particular
regions. The economic effects of an oil shortage would be global. With less energy at their disposal, societies and governments everywhere will have more
difficulty coping with problems likely to be of a more severe character—
burgeoning populations, climate change, and shortages of such critical resources as water and arable land. The problem of the salinated and damaged
farmland on which a third of the world’s crops is presently grown is a case in
point. Aside from expensive repair, costly methods like drip-irrigation will be
needed to keep such lands arable, necessitating more, not less energy.19
Another likely ramification of such an energy shock is a new wave of
debt crises and state failures. As in the 1970s, those most vulnerable would be
developing nations short on hard currency and dependent on oil imports,
which might see their development progress strangled by a spike in prices. If
the prospect of 2050s America resembling a Mad Max movie is far-fetched
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and extreme, it is not so for less fortunate regions where such regressions
have already happened, as in Somalia.20 Lacking appropriate or adequate capital, institutions, and technical knowledge, their situations will much more
readily degenerate to the point of collapse.21 And, as events in recent years
have demonstrated, advanced nations will not easily insulate themselves
from these problems, given the refuge for criminal activity and terrorism such
areas will provide, as well as the waves of refugees they may generate. It may
even be possible for practitioners of a radical ideology to seize power in a major state. Even without that happening, we could see an inward turn on the part
of major powers seeking to establish self-contained economic empires, as
happened during the Great Depression.22
Nuclear Proliferation
Alternatively, oil shortages, or the prospect of them, may put pressure on states to follow France’s path in the 1970s and invest heavily in nuclear technology. The problems posed by greater nuclear proliferation (or
poorly built and operated reactors) need little elaboration.
Perceiving a heightened threat environment amid more widespread
resource conflict and state failure, states may be more likely to seek out such
systems regardless of the inherent dangers. With greater insecurity and the
need for alternatives to fossil fuels feeding each other, the nonproliferation
regime will be under greater pressure than it is today.
A Return to 1973?
America’s dependence on foreign oil (a problem that Arctic oil drilling will not even come close to solving) makes the nation susceptible to foreign
leverage, and the Middle East aside, other major oil-producers may have strategic interests or goals conflicting with those of the United States.23 Given the
present diversity of suppliers, a future version of the OPEC embargo may be
unlikely, but the contraction of oil supplies is still likely to mean shocks ahead.
Moreover, it must be noted that the pain of a shock will not be felt
evenly. Efficient energy users will suffer less, and vice-versa. At present, that
would be to the disadvantage of the United States relative to other developed
nations like Germany.24 Correspondingly, states which derive a higher proportion of their energy from renewables would be less vulnerable economically, a condition easier to achieve if energy use is already efficient.
This raises another issue of particular concern for the position of the
United States, one generally given short shrift. The hype about information
technology in the 1990s contributed to a complacent assumption of American
technological dominance, which is simply baseless where renewable energy is
concerned.25 The small but rapidly growing world market in photovoltaics, fuel
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cell-based vehicles, and wind turbines is dominated by Europe and Japan,
where the most promising research continues. In fact, America’s profile has
actually shrunk in this area, with its share of the world market in photovoltaics
falling to 11 percent in 2004 from 25 percent just five years earlier.26
One result is that, short of a change in this situation, a conversion of
the national energy base will likely expand the already massive US trade deficit, rather than constituting a new opportunity for American growth. The possibility must therefore be considered that an oil shock may hurt the United
States more severely than the other developed nations, weakening its international position relatively as well as absolutely.

Meeting the Challenge
The most obvious response, at least from the perspective of traditional national security, is to take the dangers described above into account in
threat planning. In other words, in the event of a new energy crisis, there may
be more state failures, weapons proliferation, and resource conflict. Nonetheless, military force is inadequate to deal with the larger problem of relieving
the dependence on finite fossil fuels—although government research and development (R&D), military as well as civilian, can play (and already is playing) a role in creating a path out of that dependence.
The predominance of neoliberal economic theory makes it easy to
forget the degree to which key economic innovations have been pioneered
and supported by government.27 While it is the robber barons who are celebrated, the railroads of the 19th century were built with massive government
assistance in the form of loans, land grants, and other subsidies. In the 1950s,
no one waited for the private sector to step in and provide a highway system.
Modern computers, the internet, and space technology all benefited immeasurably from government research, and indeed may have been inconceivable
without government efforts.
The job of government is precisely to step in where a need exists
when the private sector is either unwilling or unable to satisfy it. This is the
case at present with renewable energy, and at this point it is worthwhile to reflect on America’s history in this area. “Big Science” in the United States has
been most successful when explicitly oriented toward a particular goal, as
with the early space program. The Soviet launch of the first Sputnik satellite
was a profound shock, but America responded effectively with massively enlarged investment in scientific education and research. Half a century later
the United States is in a dominant position in space, its satellite networks a
cornerstone of its unprecedented military superiority.
Where energy is concerned, the “Sputnik moment” has long since
come and gone. The project of freeing the American economy from oil depend108

Parameters

“In the event of a new energy crisis, there may be
more state failures, weapons proliferation,
and resource conflict.”

ence arguably deserves the same priority the moon mission enjoyed 40 years
ago, speaking as it does to a far more central national interest, and it is worthwhile considering why the results achieved to date have been so modest.
The simple fact is that US energy policy traditionally aimed at an expansion of oil and gas production, while investing heavily in nuclear energy.
There was a brief enthusiasm for renewable sources and conservation in the
1970s, but the economic reforms of the 1980s are generally considered to have
ended this. Research and development funding for energy was substantially reduced, and tax credits and regulations were abandoned to the end of creating a
“free market” in energy.28 The nascent alternative energy industry was not only
left to sink or swim among more mature competition, but as a net result of assorted tax policies and subsidies it was put at a disadvantage, and it withered.
When considering the character of the energy business, it is hardly
surprising that they did not pick up the slack. Energy firms invest relatively
little in R&D, about 0.5 percent of revenue, compared with 10 percent in
high-tech fields, the figure actually declining in the 1980s and 1990s.29 Moreover, the emphasis has not been on “system-shattering” research, but on “conservative innovations able to pay off in the short term,” a category which
generally has excluded renewables.30
All of this made alternative energy an especially poor candidate for
the free-market path, though to be fair, previous energy technologies typically
required massive government support before becoming sustainable. Of some
$150 billion spent subsidizing solar, wind, and nuclear energy between 1947
and 1999, more than $145 billion went to nuclear (96 percent of the total).31
This may seem appropriate, given how much more energy nuclear generators
are producing today compared with wind and solar. Between 1947 and 1961,
however, federal subsidies toward nuclear energy on a per-kilowatt basis were
40 times those provided to wind (which had then been comparably important),
and it is difficult to imagine nuclear energy’s comparative efficiency having
come about without such massively disproportionate early investment.32
Since then research dollars have continued to favor fossil fuels and
nuclear energy, arguably beyond a point of diminishing returns.33 R&D spendSpring 2006
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ing for renewables has been about $10 billion, compared with $20 billion and
$40 billion for fossil fuels and nuclear energy, respectively.34 While that figure
still appears large, it is less impressive when broken down by area. American
spending on hydrogen fuel in the 1970s, for instance, totaled a paltry $24 million and represented only a third of Western Europe’s spending on the same
area of research.35 The quality of that research spending also has been questionable, as the spectacular success of Denmark’s much smaller R&D program in
wind turbine technology demonstrates.36
In short, renewables were never given a proper chance because of a
conventional wisdom that says “let the market do it,” no matter how unwilling the market proves to be, and the disinterest of the powerful oil, gas, and
nuclear lobbies, which have continued to receive the lion’s share of government support.37 The progress of sources like wind and solar energy since the
1970s occurred not because of but in spite of the policies of the last quartercentury, and, given political realities, this seems unlikely to change. Nevertheless, with each passing year it becomes harder to deny that change is called
for, and that the arguments against a change simply do not hold water.
The resistance to planning that left the United States without an
industrial policy has resulted in a $700 billion annual trade deficit, caused
in large part by American imports of manufactured products once made at
home. With the beginning of the end of the oil age possibly around the corner,
the United States cannot afford to be without an energy policy. A logical starting point is a program to nurture renewable sources and conserve fossil fuels
on a scale far more ambitious than anything previously attempted or currently
being considered.
Even the aforementioned $10 billion figure is modest in comparison
with the sums spent on major national projects like the Manhattan Project and
the Apollo moon missions in much shorter periods of time, adjusting for inflation and economic growth. For that matter, it is modest in comparison with
public R&D spending generally, which exceeds $100 billion a year—despite
the continuing decrease of federal spending as a share of the country’s total
R&D funding.38
Whatever its precise size, this program ideally should be aimed not
only at making the United States a world leader in the field of renewable energy
sources, but at reducing America’s fossil fuel consumption below present levels in absolute terms before 2020 and eliminating fossil fuel dependence no
later than 2040 and preferably earlier. To that end, the United States should pursue a broad range of approaches, not only hydrogen (the production of which
should be delinked from fossil fuels and rare minerals to the extent possible),
but also photovoltaics, wind, ethanol, biomass, and, while they are more dependent on geography, tidal and geothermal. The characteristics of some of
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these energy sources offer a variety of practical benefits, making them worthy
of military R&D dollars.
One advantage is the potential that renewable sources offer for distributed power.39 Given the prospect that US forces will increasingly be based
in less-developed regions like the Middle East, Central Asia, and even subSaharan Africa, not being dependent on local power grids can be an advantage.
For example, at present the self-sustaining Navy base at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, has a wind turbine installation which produces 5 to 12 percent of its energy during the spring, and up to 25 percent during the windy period of the fall
months, reducing diesel imports by 650,000 gallons annually.40
At the same time, the unique needs of military programs make them
a logical starting point for at least some research in this area. Running
information-age campaigns with industrial-age logistical systems is already
problematic, and renewable energy sources or conservation technologies
might provide a partial solution. The Army is presently funding a program to
develop flexible solar panels that may ultimately be woven into the fabric of
tents or uniforms to supply power for communications equipment, computers, and other electrical appliances.41 A hydrogen fuel cell able to get more
miles per gallon could be a considerable boon to mechanized Army units, to
say nothing of Navy and Air Force units, which may see benefits even sooner.
Submarines using fuel cells are not only possible, but, in the form of the Type
212A, are already entering service with the German navy.42
Research into technologies facilitating conservation also would
play a role in a balanced strategy, since more efficient energy use makes it
easier for still-developing renewable energy power sources to meet a given
need—and, in any event, these are seen by many observers as more promising
in the near term. Energy savings can come from sources less familiar than the
typical examples of hybrid or electric cars, more efficient appliances, and solar water heating. The use of strong, ultralight materials such as new, carbonbased ceramics can reduce fuel consumption. A car made out of carbon
nanotubes, for instance, would weigh 50 pounds, and while a 50-pound car
may be unattractive for one reason or another, it demonstrates the potential
for very large fuel economies. The development of substitutes for oil in products like plastics, fertilizers, and pharmaceuticals also can assist, as can improved mass transit systems, a modern rail system, modernized power grids,
support for zero-energy housing, and practical superconductors.43
All of the above hold the promise of reducing electricity and fossil
fuel consumption to a fraction of present levels without sacrificing modern
conveniences. There also are ways in which technology can aid conservation
by enabling people and goods to move less without sacrificing economic productivity or the quality of life (and in some cases, perhaps increasing them),
Spring 2006
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as by enlarging telecommuting.44 Another is a reduction of “production sharing,” the practice of widely dispersing the manufacture of a single item or,
more radically, the movement of production closer to markets via replicating
technologies like the three-dimensional printer, a technology that exists today, albeit in its infancy.
Beyond research and development, every reasonable effort should
be made to facilitate the mass production of these technologies and adopt
them at home and abroad, including carefully thought-out tax credits and
buyback rates for net-excess power. Should American companies seriously
enter the market in new types of energy and conservation technologies, the
broadening of effort, greater production, and increased competition could
drive prices down further. Purchases of the relevant technology can be subsidized, and government and military facilities can assist by purchasing their
power from such sources, boosting the market. Protectionist measures, however, are uncalled for as a way of bringing about this end. Indeed, cooperation
would be a preferable approach, given that this already belated process might
be disrupted by very little interference. Such a project also could be a basis for
collaborating with allies irked by a perceived lack of US concern for the natural environment.
Moreover, it must be remembered that the greatest increases in oil
consumption are coming not from the developed nations, but from developing
ones like China and India. These represent perhaps an even more promising
market than developed nations for the technology in key respects. Precisely because their energy consumption is growing more rapidly than anywhere else,
their infrastructures are still being built; according to one estimate, a third of
the world’s population is still unconnected to an electric grid. Additionally,
their energy consumption will be lower for the foreseeable future, making at
least some of their demand more easily met through renewables.
Sales of the technology can be facilitated through foreign aid programs, and such an action shouldn’t be viewed as charitable. To the extent
that the access of other nations to this technology will reduce the emission of
greenhouse gases, conserve the fossil fuel supplies which will continue to
meet much of America’s energy needs for decades to come, expand the market for US companies working in this arena, and diminish the security burden
resulting from a scramble for cheap oil, then doing so will be very much in the
national interest of the United States.
The program proposed here no doubt appears exceedingly ambitious, and it certainly is, but this is a different matter from saying that it is impossible, undesirable, or unnecessary. One might also protest that despite the
unease surrounding oil prices of $70 a barrel, there is no “emergency” yet.
The point, however, is to prevent the situation from ever becoming one.
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